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Summary  findings
Chisari, Estache, and Romero assess the macroeconomic  GDP. This cut in gains represents an implicit tax of 16
and distributional effects of the privatization that  percent on the average consumer, paid directly to the
Argentina began in 1989 in gas, electricity,  owner of the utility rather than to the government. For
telecommunications, and water and sanitation. Using a  the poorest  income classes, this implicit tax is about 20
computable general equilibrium model, they track the  percent, meaning that good regulation is in the interest
effects of the changes observed between 1993, the first  of the poor.
year by which all the major privatizations had taken  The authors also shows that the privatization of
place, and 1995, the most recent year for which data are  utilities cannot be blamed for the significant increase in
available.  In an innovative  use of the  model,  they  also  unemployment  observed  in Argentina  since  1993.
assess the importance  of the  regulator  in determining  the  Effective  regulation  can  lead to a decline  in
distribution  of gains  and losses  from  utility  privatization  unemployment,  and ineffective  regulation  leads  to only  a
among  sectors  and  income  groups.  small  increase  in unemployment.  But the gains  from
They  conclude  that  when  regulators  are effective,  the  utility  privatization  were  not  sufficient  to  offset  the
annual  gains from  the private  operation  of utilities  are  negative  efficiency  and  distributional  impact  on the
about  $3.3  billion,  or  1.25  percent  of  GDP,  and that  all  economy  of the Tequila  effect,  which  increased
income  classes benefit.  Ineffective  regulation  cuts  the  unemployment  dramatically  by limiting  access to credit
gains  from  the  reform  by $1 billion  or  0.35  percent  of  for  users  and  producers  alike.
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1. Introduction
In  1989,  Argentina initiated  a  process  of  privatization of  its  infrastructure
services that was at the forefront of the international experience. The breadth of the
sectoral changes and  their  quick implementation did  not  initially reflect a  dramatic
concern for efficiency in the delivery of basic public services. They were driven instead
by the need to alleviate the fiscal burden imposed by public utilities and the need to get
the  private  sector  involved  in  financing  the  increasingly  pressing  expansion
requirements of these sectors. The concern for efficiency was a byproduct of the need
to  regulate the  sector  to  avoid  abuse by  the private  providers  of  activities  with
monopolistic features.  But  efficiency improvements are  now becoming  one  of  the
expected benefits  of  the  changes as  more  is  known about the  regulatory  options
available throughout the country.
Indeed, Argentina's reforms are not concluded yet as many provincial water and
electricity distribution companies are still in the hands of the public sector. But overall,
Argentina's  structural adjustment is proceeding well, including a clear  technological
change, the flexibilization of its labor market and the change in the pricing rules of the
key  utilities.  Much has  been written on  the institutional aspects surrounding  these
changes but, besides the publication of a few sector specific performance indicators, no
detailed assessment of their inpact on the economy is available. This is why the lessons
from this paper could still be useful to the design of provincial regulatory schemes as
well as to other countries considering similar reforms.
The main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  assess  both  the  macroeconomic and
distributional impacts of  privatization in  electricity,  gas,  water and  sanitation,  and
telecommunications services.'  This is done by comparing the economy in  1993, the
first year in which all the major privatization had taken place, and in  1995, the last
year for which data is available. The paper assumes that the changes observed in the
privatizations  already  implemented in  these sectors  will  be  duplicated  when  most
provincial services are  privatized. It  is  unlikely that  all provinces  will manage  to
concession  their  water  and  electricity  distribution  services  but  in  terms  of  the
macroeconomic impact,  what  has already  been achieved accounts for  most  of the
impact the reform is likely to have. About 33% of industrial production, almost 50% of
services  and  over  40%  of  the  population are  concentrated around  Buenos Aires.
Moreover,  large  electricity  users  throughout  the  country  can  bypass  the  local
distribution companies and access the wholesale electricity market.  The only  sector
significantly affected by the assumption is the water sector where privatization has been
limited so far to a few provinces in addition to Buenos Aires.
Shirley and Galal recently published the results of a detailed Bank study that focused on the efficiency
aspects of privatization in the UK, Chile, Mexico  and Malayisa but followed quite a different methodology
and did not address the equity aspects of privatization. For a quick overview of their main results: see
Galal, A. and M. Shirley (1994), "Does Privatization Deliver? Highlight from a World Bank Conference,"
EDI Development Studies.4
The  analytical framework is  provided by  a  computable general  equilibrium
model.  In  spite of  its  well known general  limitations, this  approach  is particularly
useful  in  this  context for  the  following reasons.  First,  in  a  structural  adjustment
context,  it allows a  careful calibration of the key technological parameters based on
information requirements much less demanding than  those of  econometric  models.
Second, it allows comparative static simulations of the impact of changes within the
sector or across the economy one at the time or  simultaneously, as needed. This  is
quite useful because it tracks down the direct and indirect impacts of all the changes in
one utility or assesses the impact of a similar change (e.g.  changes in all tariffs,  in
productivity or even in quality standards) across utilities. The direct effect focuses on
the impact of these changes through the direct consumption of the privatized goods.
The indirect impact accounts for the impact of the reform importance on the capital and
labor markets, and  through the consumption of  other goods and  services. Third,  it
allows an  assessment of  the interactions between privatization and  other significant
macroeconomic  changes such as the "Tequila Effect."
A last advantage is the possibility of using the design of the model  to assess the
importance of the effectiveness of the regulator. More specifically, this assessment is
based  on  a  comparison of  two  types  of  simulations.  The first  set  of  simulations
computes a solution to the model in which the utilities' tariffs are endogenous (within
the limits  imposed by  regulation), and  productivity and  quality  gains  are  diffused
throughout the economy. This would be the outcome expected under perfectly effective
regulation. The second type of simulation assumes fixed utilities prices which means
that the gains from privatization are appropriated by the capital owners of the sector as
a quasi-rent. This would be the expected outcome under ineffective regulation and it is
a lower bound for the gains from private operation of utilities. The difference between
the results of the first and second simulation provides an estimate of the potential quasi-
rent the new owners are likely to fight for as  well as an indication of the economic
gains from effective regulation. 2
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief summary
of the major changes that have occured in the delivery of utilities service in Argentina
since  1989. Section 2  describes the structure  of the model.  Section 4  provides  an
overview of  the key changes observed in  each sector in  terms of prices,  technical
efficiency and quality standards. Section 5 presents the results  of simulation of  the
overall  efficiency and  distributional effects of  private  operation  of  these  services.
Section 6 estimates the initial impact of the transfer of operation from the public to the
private sector. Section 7 compares the relative importance of the Tequila effect and of
the Privatization effects. Section 8 concludes.
2 An alternative interpretation could  be that the wairasian solution illustrates what a full pass through would imply for
the economy while the fixed price solution measures the implication for the economy of a cost  plus regulation in which
the "plus" factor is detemined by the efficiency gains achieved by the private operators of utilities or a price cap
regulation in which the cap is equal to the price under the public operation of the sector and the productivity gains (the
' x" factor in RPI -x) are set at 0 for ever.5
2. Argentina's  Privatizations
Some degree of restructuring took place in each sector before the transfer to
private operators. This section summarizes for each sector the changes most relevant
for the simulations to be discussed later. The description is not encompassing but gives
a sense of the major structural adjustment mentioned earlier.
Electricity.  The restructuring of the sector began in 1991 with the transfer of
most public enterprises under federal control to the private sector, the reorganization of
the institutions of the sector and the introduction of a new regulatory framework. The
three stages of production in the sector-generation,  transmission and distribution-
were vertically disintegrated and different regulatory criteria where adopted for  each
activity.  Generation became competitive, and  transmission and  distribution  became
regulated private monopolies. The regulation of the tariff and of the  quality of  the
distribution  and  transmission services is  particularly detailed in  the new regulatory
framework  to  ensure  that  the  final users  enjoy the  benefits of  competition  in  the
generation  sector.  The  regulatory  mechanism is  essentially  and  RPI-x  where  the
productivity gains x will be adjusted after 5 years. Roughly a third of all distribution
companies have now been concessioned. These cover over 60% of the population of
the country.  Since the provincial concession strategies are essentially copies of  the
National distribution concessions, the conclusions drawn from simulations of the model
based on the first wave of concessions are likely to be representative of what will be
observed in the area of jurisdiction of each distribution company.
Gas.  Gas restructuring took place at the end of 1991 when the transport and
distribution  activities  were  separated  into  two  transporters  and  eight  regional
distribution concessions. Its production activities are included in the Mining sector of
the  National  Accounts  (the  major  gas  producer,  YPF  with  over  60%  of  total
production,  was not  as successful in terms of the promotion of  competition in the
economy).  It  provides  the  major input  for the privatized companies  and  sales  are
concluded at an unregulated price. However, since the other activities are controlled by
local monopolies, as in electricity, a good regulation of tariff and quality was needed
and was introduced with the reform. The regulatory mechanism is essentially an RPI-x
where the productivity gains x will be adjusted after 5 years.
Water.  While few provincial privatizations in the water sector have occured,
the  largest  and  the  best  documented  is  the  privatization  that  transferred  the
responsibility for water and sanitation service in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area to
Aguas Argentina in May 1993. Competition was achieved through a bidding process
and  the  resulting  concession contract  has  become  the  main  regulatory  instrument
available to the regulators. It stipulates service obligation, investment requirements and
quality standards monitored by the national sector regulator. The tariff adjustments are
based on a cost plus rule. It is clear that the analysis of sector performance is based on
the information for a single company but since this company involves about 30%  of
Argentina's population and its regulation is serving as a model for most of the others, it
still seems reasonable to model this privatization experience as well.6
Telecommunications.  The  transfer  of  the  telecoms  company  to  private
operators  was concluded in  November 1990. It  was in  fact  the first  infrastructure
service concessioned. The service is now provided by two companies. Their tariffs are
regulated and service and quality obligations detailed in their concession contracts. The
regulatory mechanism is essentially an RPI-x where the productivity gains x will be
adjusted after 5 years. Since it was the first concession, the government ended up gave
up the effective short term control over monopoly powers to ensure the entry of private
investors and operators in the sector. This is the reason why current tariffs are likely to
be revised soon. There is an ongoing debate about the need to rebalance tariffs but
since a decision has yet to be made, the current rates have been used to  assess the
efficiency and distributional impact of privatization in this sector.
3. Basic Analytical Structure  of the Model
The model is built around a  social accounting matrix  (SAM) constructed for
1993 which isolates every utility from the other accounts. 3 It is consistent with national
accounts for  1993, which is also the  first year  in  which all  national utilities  were
formally managed by private operators. Its basic structure is provided in Table 3.1.
The figures in parenthesis provide the value (in billion US$) at current prices. As can
be  seen,  spendings have to  equate revenue for  each aggregate account. The  model
identifies 21 domestic production sectors, 10 for goods and 11 for services. In addition
to  the  usual  activities  under  services,  the  SAM  identifies  electricity  generation,
electricity  distribution,  gas,  water and  communications as  separate  sectors.  Three
factors of productions are accounted for:  labor, physical capital and financial capital.
Labor and financial capital are mobile across sectors while physical capital is sector
specific. Domestic consumer groups are divided into 5 income classes and there is only
one foreign consumer and one foreign producer. The small open economy assumption
is relied on, implying that Argentina is a price taker in the international markets.
Details on the data sources used to construct the accounts are provided in an
appendix available (in Spanish) from the authors but it may be helpful to summarize
here the most critical assumptions we had to make. First, some of the basic production
data was not readily available for 1993 and we had fill the holes with  1986 data, the
last  year  for  which  detailed  information  was  available.  Second,  the  matrix  of
intermediate purchases is based on the 1984 data adjusted to the values of the national
census of  1993. Third, the distribution of the factor income across income groups is
based on the distribution observed in the province of Buenos Aires in 1991. Finally,
the distribution of the consumption basket per type of goods and services is based on
the 1986 household consumption survey. In both the input and output matrix and the
household consumption, consistency for consumption and production with the national
3An  earlier version of the model without detailed infrastructure  accounts was presented in Chisari, 0.  and
C. Romero (1996), "Distribucion del ingreso, asignacion de recursos y shocks macroeconomicos," Serie
Financiamento del Desarollo #36, CEPAL, United Nations.7
accounts data was obtained by  relying on the RAS method. 4 As for the government
distribution between goods and services, data is available for 1993 for the national and
provincial governments. Municipal expenditures are assumed to be distributed  in the
same proportion as the average for the two other government levels. The infrastructure
data was based on the information on assets, inputs and expenditures available in the
annual balances of the companies of the sector and complementary  data provided by the
national regulatory entities and  the Sectoral Secretariat (Energy,  Water  Resources,
Communications).
The rest of this section presents a simplified non-analytical version of the model
to help the reader follow its main economic aspects.
Consumers.  Consumers'  utility is modeled as a  Cobb-Douglas between all
goods except for retail trade which is assumed to be purchased in fixed proportions
with  the  rest  of  the goods  and  services. The preferences  of  domestic agents  are
assumed to follow an Armington specification  which implies no perfect substitutability
in preferences between domestic and imported goods.
Expenditures are distributed between domestic and imported consumption goods
and investments. Goods and services of "privatized" firms combine quantity and quality
features but a change in quality is not necessarily associated with a change in the price of
the service provided by the privatized firm. An increase in service failures increases cost
for the buyer of services because the consumer  needs to buy a higher number of physical
units to reach the desired flow of services. This "naive" modeling approach allows for
instance to model the costs of power losses or interruptions as a proportion of unit costs.
Prices can be differentiated per income groups.
The budget constraint for each income group reflects total expenditures in goods
and services as well as indirect taxes varying by the type of good and  service,  and
direct taxes. Income sources are labor income in the private sector and in the public
sector, and capital income in private firms; revenue from profits on domestic sales and
sales abroad,  and revenue from  participation in  the privatized firm redistributed in
proportion to shares owned. Total capital wealth (physical + financial) can be negative
if the consumer group is in debt.6 Families also get public sector transfers.
Private Firms. The private firms are those for which there was no change in
ownership or any major organizational change during the period covered by the study.
They produce goods and services intended for intermediate and final consumption as
well as export and investment. This differentiation is necessary to account properly for
the differences in the tax treatment of the various destinations (for instance, exporters
See Bacharach, M. (1970), Biproportional Matrices  and Input-Output  Change, Cambridge University Prcss.
Although  not necessary  to ensure  that  the economy  does  not end up specializing,  by assumption,  the capital  installed
in the  tradeable  sectors  cannot  be reallocated.
6 An increase in the cost of debt leads to an increase in the supply of labor and a decrease in consumption
by the indebted income classes.8
do not pay the VAT and benefit from discounts on their gross income tax). There is no
technological differentiation across these sectors. Exporters of goods are price-takers
abroad and exports of services are price inelastic (i.e. they are constant). Non-tradeable
prices are determined as solution variables and adjust with factor income until markets
reach equilibrium. Credit requirements  are constant per unit of output.
Table 1: Summary  SAM  and Economic  Features  of the Model  for 1993
(in billion USS; 1993 GDP: US$256.329 billion)
Expenditures  |
Domestic  Prod.  Private  Government  Investment  External
Sectors  Consumption  Consumption  Sector
Domestic  Domestic  Spending  on  Spending  on  Final  demand  Exports:
Production  Purchases:  domestic  goods  goods  and  for investment  * the foreign
Sectors  *CES value  *  Cobb-Douglas  services:  goods  consumer has a
(21 sectors,  added for  utility in goods  * Cobb-Douglas  (42.816)  Cobb-Douglas
including  private  firms  * fixed  social  welfare  utility  in
separated  *Leontief  value  proportion  with  function  in  exports  and
infrastructure  added  for  goods  for retail  purchases  of  imports
services)  privatized firms  trade  goods and  * he can issue
*non-tradeable  * separate  service,  bonds,  Bonds  to pay
prices  are  quantity,  price  retirees  services  for net imports
market  clearing  and quality  for  and investment;  *Argentina  is a
for given  levels  each  privatized  * purchases  of  price  taker in
of rationing  in  service  goods  and  exports  and
factor markets  * rationing  services  are in  imports
*combination  possible  fixed  * whatever
with other goods  (175.082)  proportions  Argentina can't
and services in  (6.085)  consume is sold
fixed  abroad  at given
proportions  price
(132.370)  (16.237)
External  Imports  Spending  on  Imports  of
Sector  * fixed  imports  capital  goods
proportion with  * imperfect  * fixed
value  added  substitution  with  proportion  with
domestic  value added
substitutes
(8.182)  (8.727)  (4.150)
Trade  tax  Trade  tax
e  revenue  revenue
v  (1.282)  (1.133)
e  Government  Direct  taxes  Direct  taxes  paid
n  paid  by firms  by households
u  (22.461)  (4.519)  .
e  Indirect  taxes
(25.283)  __
Families  Labor  income  Salaries  and
(5 income  net of taxes:  Public  Sector









Investment  Private  Savings  Public  Savings  Foreign
(37.196)  (4.948)  Savings
(4.822)9
The product is obtained by combining intermediate inputs and value added in
fixed proportions. The value added itself is obtained by combining labor and capital
inputs  in  a  CES  production.  The  inter-industrial  transactions  requirements  are
proportional  to  total  production and  to  exports  respectively.  Privatized goods  and
services are also proportional to output which is different from the assumption made
for  consumers  where  rationing  could  occur. 7 However,  firms  can  be  subject  to
adjustment in quality of services just  as consumers and hence can face differences in
cost for the same service. 8 A quality improvement is equivalent to a cut in the absolute
value of the input requirements. Remuneration includes total payments to capital and
hence amortization. This means that the savings and investment decisions are taken by
households in the model.
Privatized  Utilities.  The privatized firms sell mostly to  the domestic market,
except for gas where some exports occur. With the exception of some differentiation
due to regulation, service obligations or to taxes according to their final users,  each
utility sector is assumed to  sell a  single product. Their profit function includes any
subsidy that could be transferred by the public sector a  differentiation of tariffs into
retail, wholesale or commercial and residential as necessary. The quality variables are
modeled as an improvement in the overall efficiency of the sector.
Outputs are limited by capacity and transmission constraints are incorporated
through the value added function. The product of the privatized sector is also based on
a fixed proportions production function for  intermediate inputs and  the value added
function in the privatized sector are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. This description of
the technology of the private  and privatized firms is  key  to  model the changes in
productivity,  efficiency and quality.  Price  regulation in  turn  is  modeled as  RPI-x,
where x is set to 0 at the beginning of the contract.
The Public Sector.  The  government  maximizes  social  welfare  including
current  collective goods produced with goods and services purchased, employment,
credit (which can be domestic or international), retirees services and a proxy for future
collective goods: public investment. The function is a  Leontief in which goods and
services are combined in fixed proportions as a single input. Pensions, bonds services,
investments,  and  current  operative  expenses  are  a  constant  proportion  of  total
government income in this model. The government faces a budget constraint given by
the sum of tax revenue, bonds but also revenue from their share of ownership in the
"privatized assets."
The  Rest  of  the  World.  The foreign consumer has  a  Cobb-Douglas utility
function. He faces faces a budget constraint. His revenue includes payments from its
share of capital in the privatized sectors. Argentina is supposed to be a price taker in
the international markets.
7Purchases of electricity in the wholesale market correspond to generation, purchases on the retail market
correspond  to  distribution.
8 This assumes that there is no possibility  of using "home-made" substitutes for infrastructure  services.10
The  Factor  Markets.  The  labor  market  in  not  in  equilibrium  so  that
unemployment is a possible outcome of any reform. The investment goods industries
are divided into two main categories: those providing capital goods for private  firms
and  those  that  construct  specific  capital  for  each  one  of  the  privatized  utilities
(electricity, gas, water and telecommunication).  This procedure allows the recognition
of  the  differential  impact  of  investment schedules established  by  the  regulatory
contracts-for  example, as network expansion commitments-on  the economy (mainly
on  the  rate  of  unemployment and  the trade  balance); therefore,  special effort  was
devoted to determine the input composition of each industry.
The Market for "Bonds."  The financial market  is  highly simplified in  this
model-when  compared  to  the  sophistication of  Argentina's  financial  sector.  Its
inclusion in the model is, however, important because it allows an assessment of the
distribution of the welfare consequences of changes in access to credit.  This access is
particularly important to the financing of infrastructure investment but it is also very
important to assess the extent to which the expected gains of infrastructure reforms can
be offset by failures to reform other sectors, the capital market in this case.
As previously mentioned, there are fixed requirements of  credit per  unit  of
output in each production sector, including recently privatized utilities. Additionally,
domestic  consumers can  be  separated into  net  debtors  (typically the  four  poorest
income brackets, to meet their demand for durable goods) and net creditors (the fifth
income bracket); the  rest  of  the  world was considered a  net  creditor  too  for  the
benchmark.  In terms of the bonds market,  debtors were represented  as issuers and
creditors  as  subscribers.  Therefore  for  domestic  families  and  for  the  foreign
consumers,  bonds were  introduced in the model giving them initial endowments but
also introducing preferences for bond holdings as arguments in their utility functions.9
The domestic bonds market adjusts to  the internal credit disequilibria of the
families and of the government and to Argentina's disequilibrium with the rest of the
world.  Internally,  the  first  4  quintiles  sell  "bonds'  (which  is  basically  a  credit
instrument) to the richest. A net increase in the demand for  bonds thus reduces the
purchasing power of the 4 poorest income groups. An increase in the price of bonds is
compensated by a decline in the purchase of other goods and with an increase in the
labor supply which can contribute to an in increase in unemployment. The firms also
demand bonds as a fixed proportion of their value added. For them, an increase in the
price of bonds implies a cut in the marginal product of labor; which in turns leads to a
reduction in the demand for labor, adding to the unemployment problem.
The benchmark simulation of the model includes both a positive unemployment
level and a commercial deficit. This implies that in addition to a disequilibrium in the
labor market, the rest of the world is financing consumption and domestic investment.
The implication for the bond market is an increase in the demand for bonds issued by
9 The information  on sectoral  and personal  net financial  positions  was obtained  from monetary  authorities
and estimated using purchases of durables goods and total capital holdings.11
with some care as many different elements are interacting and the time span used to
compare is relatively short-which  for infrastructure services is quite important as  it
takes  time  to  invest and  it  takes  time before  these investments  lead to  increased
production.  For  the water  sector for instance,  labor productivity initially  increased
tremendously as employment was reduced by 47% to determine the base year data used
in this table. Since then, the expansion requirements have been such that the company
has had to recruit to work on the investment program without a short run increase in
water production which explains the deterioration observed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Changes in Performance  between 1993 and 1995
Electricity  Electricity  Gas  Water  Telecoms.
Generation  Distribution  Distribution  Distribution
First year of private  operation  1992  1992  1992  1993  1990
Efficiency  gains  19.51%  6.26%  8.84%  4.86%  11.28%
(measured as  reduction  in
intermediate  inputs purchases
as a share of total sales value)
Labor productivity gins  23.1%.  17.59%  4.79%  -27.58%  21.25%
(measured as  GWh/staff for
electricity,  OOOm3/staff  for
gas,  population served/staff
for  water,  lines  in
service/staff  for phones)
Increases  in  investment (as  8.65%  n.a.  4.56%  75.97%  28.1%
in  concession contracts  for
gas and actual investnents for
the other sectors).
Improvements in quality  n.a.  10%  27.8%  6.12%.  4.56%
(measured as  reductions in
losses (net of consumption  by
transmission)/production for
electricity  and  gas,  water
unaccounted  for/production
for water, lines in repair/lines
in service for phones
Changes  in  real  average  n.a.  -9.5%  -0.5%  5.5%  -4.9%
tariffs
(defined as  total sales value
by  a  physical  indicator of
production)
Note: The table reflects  the changes  achieved  under private  management  of the services.  Indeed, 1993 data
reflects  the first  year in which  all sectors  had benefited  from  some  initial  adjustment  by the  private  operator.  1995
is the last  year for which  data  is available  at the time  of this writing.
In general however, Table 4.1  shows continuing improvements under  private
management. For most sectors, the most dramatic adjustment in labor productivity took
place immediately after the private take-over of operations in 1990-1991 for all sectors
except  water.  This  can  be  seen  in  Table  4.2  which  shows the  changes  in  labor
productivity observed just before the private operators actually took over. It took a bit
longer to  achieve the efficiency gains measured in Table 4.1  and used for the main
simulations discussed below.12
As for other performance indicators, the assessment task was quite challenging.
Non-labor productivity  indicators  (such  as  purchases  of  intermediate inputs)  were
difficult to assess because most of the public companies did not  follow commercial
accounting practices. There was also problem is assessing the impact on  investment
because, the investment program is typically spread over several years. As typical, the
largest increases in relative terms occurred in the first year of operation of each firm
since the public managers did not invest at all in most cases as a  result of the fiscal
constraints of  the  country.  None  of  the available  quality  indicators  can  easily  be
modeled so only simulations on the yields from gains in this area for 3 sectors could be
done,  having to exclude water. Finally, average tariffs continued to fall in electricity
and gas. After a reduction in tariff at the time of the privatization in water, the average
tariff  has begun to  increase even if  the legal tariff is still below  what it was under
public management. Our best estimates of some of these indicators are in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2:  Chan  es in Performance at the Time of Privatization
Electricity  Electricity  Gas  Water  Telecoms.
]______________________________  -Generation  Distribution  Distribution  Distribution
Efriciency  gains  43.4%  21.3%  1.3%  n.a.  n.a.
(measured  as reduction  in intermediate
inputs purchases as % of total  sals  a  __  _
Labor productivity  gains  95.1%  80.3%  35.6%  75.2%  37.8%
(measured  as GWh/staff  for electricity,
OOOm31staff  for gas, population
served/staff  for water,  lines  in
service/staff for phones)
Changes  in real average tariffs  n.a.  4%  n.a.  -1.92%  n.a.
(defined  as total  sales  value  by a physical
indicator of production)  _
Sources:  see  Data  Appendix  Available  upon  request  from the authors
S.  Assessing  the  Long  Run  Efficiency  And  Distributional Effect  of  Private
Operation
There  are  many ways to  assess the  effect of  the  changes described  in  the
previous section on the rest of the economy and on the various income classes. The
main focus of the discussion of the efficiency effects of the reforms on the rest of the
economy is on the standard macroeconomic indicators. This includes levels of activities
in the 21 sectors of the economy identified by the SAM as well as prices and the usual
expenditure categories. As for the distributional effects of the reform, the analysis is
based on an indicator of welfare change in each income group as well as the calculation
of a Gini coefficient for the economy. Since personal distribution depends heavily on
factors relative rewards, they are also included in the table.
The choice of simulations can also be quite helpful in differentiating the analysis
of the effects of the reform by type of change. In addition to tracking down the effects
of all the changes observed in each sector on the rest of the economy, the simulations
can also be designed to isolate the effects of each one of the changes identified in Table
4.1. For instance, the effect of improving labor productivity gains in all infrastructure
sectors on the country's unemployment rate can be a very important policy concern.13
From this point forward, we are considering the total operational gains achieved
in each utilities' sub-sector to be the sum of the effects of four specific changes:
Efficiency: changes in inputs per unit of output modeled as a reduction in an
in equation [9] in the appendix; the efficiency gains are taken as reductions
in the quantity of inputs used by the privatized sector to obtain one unit of
output (i.e. as a cut in the same proportion of the input-output coefficients
of  the  column  corresponding  to  the  specific  sector);  the  gains  are
unincorporated and generate an  increase in  capacity of the  economy to
generate a surplus.
*  Productivity: changes in labor productivity modeled as a reduction in the
relevant Lri in equation [10]; productivity gains are computed as efficiency
gains in work so that less L is needed to obtain a given level of service;
*  Quality: changes in  quality  measured in  terms of  product  changes and
modeled as changes in a,i, and ari  in equation [9]; they are computed as
reductions in the coefficients of the quantity of the privatized inputs needed
to produce one unit of output in the other sectors;
3  Tariffs: for  fixed prices:  they are  modeled as  the  actual utilities  price
changes observed.
There  are also  other ways of  squeezing information out  of  the model.  The
selection of the closure rule is an important instrument to that effect. To mimic the
adjustment that takes place in Argentina now that price deregulation is the prevailing
policy, prices can be assumed to adjust freely throughout the economy to any of the
changes identified in Table 4.1. But this implies that regulation is effective and that the
private providers of public services are unable to generate their monopolistic positions
to extract rents. In that sense, this kind of simulation  provides an upper bound for the
gains from privatization in Argentina. On the other hand, if the regulator is ineffective,
the rent could be quite significant. This can be simulated by keeping the price of the
infrastructure services fixed, implying that any reduction in cost that results from the
reforms accrues to the private operator. This then provides a lower bound for the gains
from  privatization. It  turns  out  that  this  effect is  most  important in  terms of  the
distribution  of  income  since  the  distribution  of  ownership  of  capital  is  the  key
determinant of who gets the rent.
More specifically, the design of the two closure rules used can be summarized
as follows:
*  Flexible price: under this closure rule, all domestic prices adjust to  clear the
markets, except salaries so that there is unemployment in the model; for  the
markets for privatized services, prices are determined by the economy as in the
case of all non-tradeable  goods; the prices of tradeable goods are fixed in foreign
currency since Argentina is assumed to be a price taker in international markets;
the capital market is also somewhat peculiar since capital is sector specific, the
rates of return are endogenous to each industry; finally, the outcome of the trade14
balance is  offset in  the bonds market and  if the  domestic economy requires
financing, the prices of bonds increase.
*  Fixed price: under this rule, the prices of privatized services are given but the rule
for the determnination  of tradeables and non-tradeable prices and the rules for the
labor market are not altered; since the prices of the privatized utilities are set in
foreign  currency,  quantity  variables  are  needed  to  have  all  the  required
endogenous variables; in fact, their price function is as if they were minimum
prices. If the tariff declines, say as a result of improvements in efficiency for
instance, rationing occurs: at the regulated  price, a competitive industry would be
willing to sell more than the monopoly but cannot do so; this approach reproduces
the process in which the firm can capture a monopoly rent.
As discussed in more detail below, the effects of technological improvements
and  efficiency gains  have a  substantial impact on  the  interpersonal distribution  of
income through the effects of changes in the unemployment rate. In general terms, the
poorest tend to depend much more than the richest on the state of the labor market and
this is turn  is directly and  indirectly influenced by the privatization of utilities,  The
impact of privatization is indeed not only through labor productivity gains in utilities
and through reduction in the costs of sectors using utilities services as an input,  but
also through reductions in input requirements of the production of utilities services. For
instance, the privatized utilities buy intermediate inputs from the manufacturing sectors
for an equivalent of 23% of their value added, services for 19% and primary inputs for
12% as seen in Table 5.1  which summarizes the input-output matrix.  Moreover,  the
interaction between utilities is quite significant as well. The water sector is the largest
client of the electricity sector for instance.
Table 5.1: Summary Input-Output  Matrix Uses for the SAM
(%  of Gross output  value)
Agriculture  Industry  Infrastructure  Construction  Services
Agriculture  8.48  13.29  5.88  3.32  0.37
Industry  7.08  20.37  8.88  41.67  10.14
Infrastructure  0.12  2.22  18.43  0.39  1.56
Construct.  0  0  0  0  0
Services  12.31  12.76  8.86  12.59  17.37
Imports  0.18  5.98  0.45  0.94  0.35
Value  Added  71.5  45.4  57.5  41.1  70.2
Output  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  see Data  Appendix  available  upon request  from the  authors.
The changes in performance derived from the privatizations act on the level of
welfare of the various income groups through the following channels:
*  directly, through the consumer (residential) prices of the privatized services
*  indirectly, through the changes in input costs of the industries using these services
*  indirectly, through the reduction in prices of the inputs purchased by the privatized
utilities
*  directly or indirectly through remuneration in the factor markets.
The effects can be separated into tw6 main types: macroeconomic and income
distributional. Just to give the reader a global feeling for the changes brought about by15
the operational gains estimated, Table 5.2 presents a summary of a general equilibrium
calculation of  the  levels and  distribution of  gains  across  income classes  from  the
efficiency and  quality improvements due to  the privatization process and  those that
could be achieved from effective regulation. To give some perspective on the relative
importance of the gains achieved, these gains are also expressed in terms of the annual
expenditures of each income class on utilities in 1993.
Table 5.2: Gains from Private Operation of Public Utilities
Income  class  Savings  from  Savings  from  (A)/income  class  (B)/income  class
operational  gains  effective  regulation  expenditure  on  expenditure  on
(A)  (B)  utilities  utilities
(in millions of  (in millions of
1993 US$)  1993  US$)
1 (poorest)  197  138  29%  20%
2  259  142  31%  17%
3  373  121  37%  12%
4  403  214  32%  17%
5 (richest)  1047  302  59%  17%
Total  2279  915  41%  16%
Note: these figures represent  annual  gains. (A) is the equivalent  variation  computed  in terms of the S revenue  of
each income class. It is calculated  by applying the total gains in the fixed price simulation  to the income in the base year.
(B) is computed by applying the differences in gains between  the fixed price and the flexible price simulations. In net
present value and over a period of 10 years, the (A) gains represent  a total varying  between USS 8.2 billion and USS14.4
billion with discount rates varying between 12% and 18% and amortization  rates between  0% and 10%. The gains from
efficient  regulation  under similar  assumptions  vary between  USS 3.3 billion and USS 5.8.
This table summarizes some of the key lessons of the paper:
•  operational gains clearly benefit strongly all income groups: on average these
gains represent the equivalent of 41 % of what households tend to  spend on
utilities services even when the regulator allows the new owner of the sector to
keep  as  much as  possible  of  these  gains  as  a  quasi-rent;  these  gains  also
represent about US$ 2.3 billion or 0.9% of Argentina's GDP
*  the gains from effective regulation add up to  16% on  average when the
regulator is as  effective as  it  should be and the  quasi-rent generated by
improvements  in  efficiency, productivity,  quality  and  tariffs  are  distributed
throughout the economy; these gains also represent a  gain of  almost US$  1
billion  or 0.35% of GDP which  can be seen as an approximation  of the shadow
price of effective regulation; it also shows why private operators have a  very
strong incentive to contest any decision by regulators that forces them to share
the quasi-rent with the rest of the economy.
*  the direct gains are relatively significantly higher for the higher income classes
(59% as compared to 29% for the poorest) and this is explained by the fact that
when regulation  is not effective,  the gains from privatization  are turned into a
quasi-rent captured by the richest who are the largest domestic owners of capital
of  the  infrastructure services; part  of  these gains  are  also  captured  by  the
foreign consumers and by the government since they own a large share of the
"privatized" assets;16
*  the indirect gains through effective regulation, in contrast,  tend to  favor  the
poorest income classes relatively more even if it is clear that all tend to gains
from efficient regulation, even the richest.
All sectors did not contribute equally to these changes. Table 5.3 summarizes an
estimate of the relative contribution of each sector to initial changes and to the general
equilibrium effects of the reforms.  It  shows that the main initial  shock came  from
electricity distribution (33%) while water had the smallest initial impact (0.2%). This is
a somewhat biased result since one of the largest gains of the water privatization was
the access to private funds to finance the expansion of the network to increase access to
water services and that increase will only take place over time.  The largest general
equilibrium gains came from gas which is a key input not only for various industries
but also for heating and cooking in many of the poorest households. Note also that the
gains from reform in electricity only increased modestly after the initial shock. This is
because all the gains were achieved through the creation of a competitive market which
remains  competitive  in  the  longer  run  and  which  only  benefits  from  marginal
improvements from privatization in some of its own infrastructure inputs. Note finally
that the general equilibrium gains in the water sector are much larger than the initial
shock reflecting  the employment increases needed to  ensure  the  expansion of  the
network and from increased access by the poor to the service.
Table 5.3 Relative Sectoral Contribution  to Changes
(as  % of total  changes)
Participation  in initial  change  Participation  in general  equilibrium  welfare  gains
Fix price  Flexible  price
Electricity Generation  13.2  14.4  15.8
Electricity  Distribution  33.0  22.3  19.5
Gas  26.0  44.9  41.4
Water  0.2  5.5  2.4
Telecorns  27.0  12.9  20.9
Note:  the  contribution  to changes  is calculated  with respect  to changes  in the  value  added  and  is  computed  as  a % of the  total
value  in S.  The  general  equilibrium  effects  are  based  on the  sum  of the  sector  specific  simulations  for all changes.
The following section provides details.
5.1 Macroeconomic  Effects
The  analysis  of  the  macroeconomic effects  is  relatively  complex  since  it
involves simultaneous changes in the familiar's expenditure decisions, in the demand
for  factors  and  in  the  government's  revenue.  The  relative  importance  of  these
interactions can be adjusted through the various assumptions made for parameter values
and  this  is why general  equilibrium model shows that ex-post observations can  be
subject  to  various  interpretations and reflect  very  different  theoretical assumptions
about the actual structure of the economy.
Before  discussing  some  of  the  more  specific  results,  it  may  be  worth
highlighting how the various sources of gains affect both supply and  demand. The
supply side can be affected by any improvement that frees resources. These include: (i)
the simple efficiency gains since they free resources; (ii) increases in quality since they17
reduce costs directly; and (iii) labor productivity gains can reduce production costs.  But
the  demand  side  is  not  indifferent to  these  changes.  The  increase  in  consumption
derived  from  the  higher  revenue  of  the  owner  of  the  sector  or  from  lower
unemployment can neutralize or offset some of the expansionary impact on the supply
side.  For  instance  a  potential  increase  in  exports  can  be  offset  by  the  increased
domestic demand  that results  from  higher domestic  income.  The assessment  of  how
these interactions work is at the core of some of the explanations given next.
5.1.1 Effects of Sector Specific Changes
In  terms of GDP,  the largest general equilibrium  impact is obtained  from  the
gas sector as seen in Table 5.4.  The smallest impact is from the water sector reform
but  this  is  probably  because  most  of  the  gains  would  come  from  increases  in
investments which are  not considered  in this  simulation as  explained earlier.  As  for
unemployment, reforms in gas and water lead to some decline even when the regulator
performs  poorly  (fixed price case) while the reforms  in telecoms  leads to increases.
The  specific  impact  of  the  electricity  reforms  on  unemployment  depend  on  the
effectiveness  of  the  regulator  but  in  general  they  did  not  have  much  impact  on
unemployment. The net effect on macroeconomic productivity is somewhat surprising.
The less  effective regulators are,  the  larger the total  productivity gains.  In  fact,  the
total productivity gains from an ineffective regulator is three times larger than under an
effective  regulator.  This  is  due  to  a  large  extent  to  the  gas  sector  where  a  wide
distribution of the economic rent leads to a significant deterioration in productivity.
The results in terms of total labor productivity are influenced by the generalized
decreasing marginal productivity of the economy. If the level of activity expands in the
labor  intensive  sectors  (and  the  unemployment  rate  falls);  the  average  producivity
should  be  declining  or  at  least  not  increasing  significantly.  The  productivity  gains
achieved in the Argentine economy during the first years of the 1990s should then also
be explained by the changes observed in the other sectors of the economy--very often
as incorporated into the imports of capital goods.
Table 5.4:
Sector Specific Macroeconomic Effects of Private Management of the Sector
(measured in changes over base year 1993, except for U in absolute terms)
Electricity  Electricity  Gas  Water  Telecoms  Total
Generation  Distribution
pfLxed  p  pfixed  p  p  pflex  p  pflex  p  p  p  pflex
flex  flexc  fLred  _  fixed  _  fixed  flex  fLxed
GDP  0.05  0.10  0.17  0.21  0.36  0.31  0.02  0  0.07  0.19  0.70  0.79
Industrial  -0.01  0.09  0.21  0.29  -0.07  0.20  -0.01  0  0.04  0.10  0.16  0.66
production  I  I  I_I
Unemployment  0  -2.47  -1.08  1.17  -1.93  -6.76  -3.22  -2.36  6.75  3.21  2.35  -4.50
Price of  -0.12  0.18  0.77  0.78  -0.33  0.64  -0.05  -0.02  0.22  0.88  0.49  2.48
tradeable/price  of
non-tradeable
Exports/Imports  0.09  0.67  -0.25  0.67  -2.95  0.42  -0.31  0.02  0.75  0.77  -2.47  2.52
Industrial  exports  0.41  1.41  0.36  2.15  -6.84  -2.11  0.50  0.07  1.40  1.59  - -4.91  2.72
GDP/  0.09  -0.13  0.09  0.39  0.19  -0.42  -0.29  -0.22  0.88  0.60  1.01  0.32
Employment
Note: n.s. stands for not significant.18
As  for  international trade,  the  results  are  clearer  and  closer  to  expectations.
While the reform in utilities do not have much of an impact on imports (because there
is not  much shift  in the sources of capital in the sectors),  the sign of  their effect  on
exports depends on the overall performance of sector specific regulators of gas,  water
and electricity.  If they are effective, exports  increase,  if they are not,  they decrease.
Similarly, when the quasi-rent is kept by the sector specific capital, the relative price of
tradeable increases only by a fifth of what it improves when regulators are effective.
The  clearest  lesson  from  Table  5.4  is that  the economy  is  not  losing  in  the
aggregate as a result of the observed performance of the privatized utilities and that the
total  gains  are  larger  when prices  are flexible,  although problems can  appear  in  the
distribution  of the gains between the various income classes,  the government  and  the
foreign owners as discussed later.  It is noteworthy that some of the gains can be high
enough to off-set losses in some other activities. The gains in construction for instance
are  often  large because that  sector  supplies the richest  quintile who  always  benefits
from the reform as the main domestic owner of the privatized capital.
5.1.2 Effects of Changes  in Specific Performance  Indicators
A quick look at the disaggregation of the effects of sectoral changes by source
of. change  can  be  quite  useful  as  seen  in  Table  5.5.  The  simulation  answers  the
following  question:  "imagine  that  the  reform  manages  to  improve  only  one
performance  indicator  at  the  time  in  all  sectors  simultaneously,  how  would  the
macroeconomic indicators  react?"  The only safe prediction made by the model is that
whatever performance indicator is concerned,  improvements will always lead to lower
import requirements. Another relatively safe bet is that, with the exception of the direct
effect of increases in labor productivity in each sector through employment reductions,
any improvement  in  the performance  of the utilities  will  lower unemployment.  Any
improvement  in  the performance  indicators  tends  to  improve  aggregate  productivity
(except improvements in efficiency) or the country's  export performance (except when
the quality improves only and the regulator is effective).
Table  5.5
Effect of Changes  in Performance  Indicators  on Selected  Macroeconomic
Aggregates
Efficiency  Labor  Quality
productivity
p fixed  pflex  p  fixed  |p  flex  p fixed  pflex
GDP  +  +  - +  +  +
Unemployment  none  - +  +
Price of tradeable/price  of non-tradeable  +  +  +  +
Exports/Imports  +  +  +  +  +
GDP/Employment  ++  +  +19
The effect on the other macroeconomic indicators is not as easy to predict,  in
particular  it  is  not  easy  to  predict  how  each  improvement  will  contribute  to  the
international competitiveness of  the country. The  relative price  of  tradeable  good  is
only guaranteed to improve with improvements in labor productivity.  It is guaranteed
to  deteriorate  with  improvements  in  efficiency  and  the  sign  of  the  effect  of  the
improvement  in  quality  depends  on  the  performance  of  the  regulator.  Quality
improvements will only help when the regulator is effective in ensuring  that the rents
are shared by all in the economy.
5.1.3 Sector Specific Effects of Changes
Table 5.6  summarizes the major impact of the reforms on the other sectors  of
the economy. The most obvious observation is that when the regulator is effective, the
only sector that loses is sector 1 (agriculture, forestry and fisheries). All other sectors
benefit from the reforms when prices are flexible. When prices are not flexible and the
owners of  utilities get to  keep the quasi-rent generated by the reforms,  a  few more
sectors  stand to  lose in  addition to  sector 1:  lumber and wooden products,  transport
material and equipments, and financial services, insurance and enterprise services.
The gains are almost always larger when the regulators are effective (except in
construction).  The  largest  gains  under  flexible prices  are  achieved by  non-metallic
mineral  products,  commerce,  basic  metallic  industries,  restaurant  and  hotels,  and
personal and social services. When the regulators are not as effective as they should be,
basic  metal  industries  are  still  gaining  but  much  less  than  before  and  construction
becomes one of the main winner.  These results  suggest that construction  is the only
sector that would have an incentive to endorse a poor regulatory performance.
Table 5.6: Changes  in Sectoral  Activity  Levels
Sector  Description  P Flex  P Fixed
I  Agriculture,  Forestry  and Fisheries  -0.10  -0.19
2  Mining  0.25  0.11
3  Foods, Beverages and Tobacco  0.44  0.08
4  Textiles and Leather  0.54  0.04
5  Lumber and Manufacture of Wooden Products  0.11  -0.06
6  Paper, Cardboard and Editorials  0.88  0.30
7  Basic Chemical and Petrochemical Industries  0.49  0.14
8  Non-Metallic Mineral Prod. (excl. derived from petroleum)  1.27  0.38
9  Basic Metal Industries  3.51  1.47
10  Metallic Prod., Home Appliance and Capital Goods  0.83  0.17
11  Transport Material and Equipment  0.21  -0.11
15  Construction  0.70  0.97
16  Commerce,  Restaurant and Hotels  1.26  0.84
18  Transport  0.83  0.51
19  Financial Services, Insurance and Enterprise Services  0.10  -0.05
20  Personal and Social Services  1.52  0.83
Weighted Average  0.686  0.34920
To  see how these results are obtained and how changes in the performance  of
utilities  have general  equilibrium impacts,  consider the two following extreme cases:
basic metal industries and construction.  Activity in the first  adjusts to changes  in the
inter-industrial  production chain while activity  in the latter sector essentially depends
on the revenue of the richest income group which is also the group that tends to benefit
the most from  a poor  distribution of the quasi-rent created by  ineffective regulation.
The  basic  metal  industry's  key  inputs  include  electricity  and  mining  (which  also
supplies  gas).  This  is why any  improvements in quality  or productivity  in electricity
and gas tend to have so dramatic effects in these sectors. The changes observed in the
construction are driven by investment plans.  In this model, investment plans are driven
by the consumers and the government (not the firms).  Since the utilities functions are
Cobb-Douglas  (with  a  few  exceptions  irrelevant  here),  the  demand  for  investment
goods is proportional to revenue, in particular the richest one. Since the revenue of the
richest  income class is relatively larger when the regulator  is ineffective,  the demand
for investment is higher in that case and so is the demand for construction services.
The poor performance of the agricultural sector can be explained by the fact that
this  sector is not a heavy direct user of the privatized services. In fact,  gains in other
sectors tend to result in competition for some of the key resources it tends to use such
as labor and financing,  so that the gains achieved through an  increased demand from
the  food  industry  are  not  large enough  to  compensate for  the  losses resulting  from
tougher competition in the factor markets.
5.2 Distributional Effects
There  are  many  ways  of  looking  at  the  distributional  implications  of  the
reforms.  One is to compare factor incomes. The most  standard one is to compute the
Gini coefficient.  A more revealing indicator however  is to compute the impact on the
income level of families in terms of some form of welfare indicator. In this paper,  it is
computed in terms of equivalent variation adapted to compute the effect of changes in
prices as well as in quality.
Consider  v(p,  M,  y), the indirect utility  function of  the representative  agent,
depending  on the price  vector p,  the agent's  revenue  M and  a quality  or  a  quantity
variable y which can also represent rationing  of a service.  If,  as a  result of a policy
change,  the  price  vector with  initial value po becomes  lower,  say  pl,  the equivalent
variation EV is computed as:
v(po, M+EV,  y)  =  v(pI, M, y)
It is the variation in income that maintains the consumer at the same level of utility he
or she would achieve from the reduction of price at the initial income level.  In other
words,  it is the amount one would have to give the consumer to make him/her give up
the change  in  price  (willingness-to-accept). It  can be  computed  in  a  similar  way  to
assess the impact of an improvement in quality.21
Similarly,  the equivalent  variation  can be computed  for the equivalent  monetary
compensation  of a quality improvement  or for an increase  in access to a public service
from a.  to al
v(p, M+EV,  ct,)  =  v(p, M, aI).
In general  terms, to identify  the sources  in the welfare  changes  for each income
class, the following  facts need to be recognized:  (i) the relative  importance  of the cost
of services provided by privatized sectors in the household budgets; and (ii) the
distribution  of factor ownership  across  income  classes.
Table 5.7 presents  the basic structure  of household  expenditures  in a summary
form. It shows  that the relative importance  of the utilities  services is much higher for
the poorest income  classes.  It is however  worth noting  that this observation  holds only
for the subsectors  of gas and electricity  where the poorest income  group spends  about
three times what the richest pay in relative  terms. For water the opposite  is true: the
share of expenditure  on water  services  spent by the richest income  class is about twice
the share spent by the poorest. Finally, Table 5.7 shows that telecom services are
relatively  more important  to the middle  class than to any other class.
Table 5.7: Composition  of Household  Expenditures  per Income  Class
(as  % of total expenditures)
___  _  _Income  classes 
(__poorest)  L  _  _  _  __1  _  (richest)
Agricultural  6.06  4.22  3.33  2.73  1.76
god
Industrial  Goods  45.74  42.69  40.66  38.64  34.05
Non-utilities  43.73  49.45  42.78  55.65  61.46
Services  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Utilities  (total)  4.47  3.65  3.23  2.98  2.72
Electricity  2.19  1.51  1.20  0.99  0.69
Gas  1.05  0.73  0.58  0.48  0.33
Water  0.33  0.34  0.36  0.41  0.66
Telecoms  0.90  1.07  1.10  1.09  1.04
Source:  see  Data  Appendix  available  upon  request  from the  authors.
Table 5.8 shows the distribution  of factor income across income classes and
confirms the expectation  of many in terms of the distribution of assets and factor
income.  It explains  why the richest income  class stands  to gain the most from a poor
distribution  of the quasi-rents  generated by the privatizations:  they are the largest
owners  of capital in the economy.  In fact about 90% of total capital is concentrated  in
the two highest  income  groups.22
Table  5.8  Distribution  of Factor  Income  per  Income  Classes  (1993)
Composition  Shares
(as  % of total  class  income)  (as % of total factor inme)
Labor  Physical  Financial  Transfers  Labor  Capital  Total
Capital  Capital  _  . Income
1  71.72  19.42  0.40  8.46  11.22  3.76  7.32
(poorest)
2  64.03  26.65  0.41  8.90  14.52  7.64  11.02
3  64.25  26.97  0.95  7.84  21.41  10.73  15.42
4  62.84  29.19  1.92  6.04  27.85  16.34  22.15
5  28.86  61.00  5.73  4.41  25.00  61.51  44.07
(richest)  I  I  I
Source: see Data Appendix  available  upon request  from the authors.
Table 5.9 completes the description of the stylized facts about the distribution of
ownership by focusing on the ownership of the privatized utilities. It shows that the
public  sector  remains  a  key  player  in  electricity distribution  since  many  of  the
provincial utilities have not yet been privatized. It also shows that a large share of the
returns and rents generated in these sectors will go abroad since 50% of the ownership
is foreign in electricity generation, gas and teleconmnunications.  The domestic private
sector is a significant owner of the privatized water utilities and of the gas sector as
well. A somewhat cynical conclusion that can be drawn from  this table  is that the
public  sector  does  not  necessarily  have  a  strong  incentive  to  have  an  effective
regulation of  water and electricity distribution since it is  a  major  owner  of sector
specific capital in these activities and in the short run, it may stand to gain a large share
of the quasi-rents generated in these sectors.
Table 5.9
iDistribution  of Ownership  of the  Sector
Electricity  Electricity  Gas  Water  Telecoms
Generation  Distribution
Public Sector  [32.36  76.04  17.57  34.75  30.00
Foreign  49.66  15.29  50.51  17.36  51.42
Domestic  17.98  8.67  31.92  47.89  18.58
Source: see Data  Appendix  available  upon  request  from the authors.
The  rest  of  this  section shows how  the  general  equilibrium effects  of  the
reforms affect the distribution.
5.2.1 Distributional Effects of Sector Specific Changes
Table 5.10 shows the distributional implications of all reforms in each sector.
The last column estimates the total impact of the private operation of public utilities in
Argentina. It shows that the overall distribution of income improves as indicated by the
negative sign on the Gini co-efficient. The overall improvement is however 6 times23
larger  when the  regulators are  effective and  prices are  "walrasian."  The  last two
columns also show that the largest gains are for the poorest as indicated by the highest
equivalent variation. But  once more the distribution of  gains  is somewhat different
when the regulators are  not effective. This  is  because under  ineffective regulation,
average labor income gains,  the major source of wealth among the poorest,  is only
about a fifth of what it would be under effective regulation. Also note that, while both
average labor and capital income tend to improve with the reforms,  capital income
earners are on average much better off than labor income earners and hence havea
much stronger incentive to push for the reforms.
The poorest stand to gain the most from improvements in gas and electricity
(major inputs in their  consumption basket). They also stand to gain relatively  more
from  improvements in  water,  although their  main  source  of  gain  (access)  is  not
modeled  here.  Finally  the  middle  income  class  stands  to  gain  the  most  from
improvements in telecommunications, but only if the regulator is effective. Otherwise
they end up paying a huge rent to the private operators of the services.
Table  5.10: Decomposition of Sector Specific Distributional Effects
Electricity  Gas  Water  Telecoms  Total
Distribution
op  faxed  p flex  p  fixed  p  fxed  pfle  pfed  p  flex
Gini  0.01  0  -0.05  -0.22  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  0.07  -0.06  -0.24
EV for income  0.29  0.41  0.54  1  0.13  0.09  0.08  0.21  1.19  1.99
group 1 (poorest)
EV for income  0.21  0.29  0.47  0.74  0.10  0.07  0.11  0.26  1.03  1.57
group  2  __  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
EV for income  0.18  0.21  0.51  0.65  0.10  0.07  0.11  0.26  1.05  1.38
group  3  __  _  _  _  __  __  _  _
EV for income  0.16  0.17  0.39  0.56  0.09  0.06  0.04  0.24  0.78  1.20
group 4  1
EV for  income  0.25  0.32  0.43  0.45  0.00  -0.01  0.19  0.35  1.02  1.30
group 5 (richest)  I
average labor  0.40  0.40  -0.19  0.33  -0.03  -0.01  0.12  0.49  0.24  1.29
income  I  _I
average capital  0.44  0.56  0.51  0.71  0.01  0  0.54  0.17  1.60  1.68
i co  m  e  I  __  _I  _  _I__  _I__  _I__  _I
Note: Gini and average  factor income  are expressed  as % change  over base year (1993). EV (equivalent  variations)  in terms
of total  income of the  bracket.
5.2.2 Effects of Changes in Specific Performance Indicators
Table  5.11  shows  that  the  only  two  performance  improvements  that  can
significantly  contribute  to  improve  the  distribution  of  income  are  better  sector
efficiency  and  service  quality.  All  other  indicators  tend  to  deteriorate  income
distribution.  Improvements in  labor productivity tend to  increase unemployment and
this tends to hurt the poor more than the rich. In fact, the direct effect tends to hurt the
thrid and fourth quintile proportionately more because they benefited relatively more
from employment in public enterprises (these two income classes combined equal about
42% of the public employment in  1993) but did not benefit much from the reforms
since they own very little of the capital of the privatized firms.  The highest income24
group benefited from 34.8% of public jobs but was not as exposed to the consequences
of privatization because it includes the main owners of the privatized utilties and thus
gets a direct access to the payoffs from privatization.
- Increases in investment tend to benefit the owner of the utilities relatively more
than the poor  workers even if  these tend to benefit from  less unemployment when
investment is higher. In fact, the average labor income ends up being higher under all
performance inprovements  except quality improvements but these improvements are
lower than the gains achieved on average by capital income.
In terms of specific income groups, the calculation of the equivalent variation
for each income group is quite revealing. It shows that in general only improvements in
firm efficiency and service quality tend to benefit every consumer group. In the other
cases,  the  four  poorest  quintiles are  worse  off.  The  only  exception is  when  bad
regulators allow the utilities to benefit from the rent generated in the sector. This  can
be seen easily in the EV of the richest quintile: it is the only income group improving
its welfare through changes in any of the indicators In relative terms, the poorest tend
to gain the most from efficiency and quality improvements and  lose the most from
improvements in labor productivity even if average labor income is higher. Finally, a
good regulator leaves all income classes better off than a bad regulator.
Table  5.11:
Effects  of Changes  of Performance  Indicators  on the Distribution  of Income
Efficiency  Labor productivit  Quality  _
pfLred  | pfl.  . pfixed  p fllex  |  fixed  |e
Gini  coefficient  better  much  much  worse  better  much  better
better  worse
EV for Income  Group  better  much  much  worse  better  much  better
I (poorest)  better  worse
EV for Income  Group  better  much  much  worse  better  much  better
2  better  worse
EV for Income  Group  better  much  much  worse  better  much  better
3  better  worse
EV for Income  Group  better  much  much  worse  better  much  better
4  better  worse
EV for Income  Group  better  much  better  much  better  much  better
5  (richest)  better  better
Average  Labor  Income  worse  better  better  much  better  much  better
____  ____  ____  ____  ___  ____  ___  ____  ____  ___  ____  ___  b  etter  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Average  Capital  better  much  better  much  better  much  better
Income  better  better
6. Initial Effect of the Change to Private Operation
So far what  has been measured are the gains from private  operation  of  the
utilities, but the initial gains achieved in preparation for the change in ownership in all
sectors between 1991 and 1993 (except water which was concessioned in  1993 only)
were quite significant as well. There are various reasons why the general equilibrium
effect of the privatization decision is hard to assess in this case. First,  there are data
problems.  Many  of  the  public  enterprises did  not  have  proper  accounting,  were
vertically integrated without separate accounting for the various types of activities (as25
in electricity) or were not required to provide consistent information. Some of these
gaps were closed in preparation for the privatization process, but as was the case for
the water sector, the  basic knowledge of the state of the assets and quality  of the
service was so poor that much of what was published in the data sheets and presented
to  potential bidders were  rough estimates. Second, the environment in  which  these
firms performed had changed quite a bit also, including for instance the tax code or the
international capital markets. This is why a precise estimate of the initial impact is so
hard to achieve.
It seems worth trying to assess this impact through a counterfactual simulation
in which the private operator of the firm follows the employment, pricing and input
purchases policies followed by the public owners of the utilities before they took over.
But even this  exercise is subject to data limitation because the relevant data is  not
available for all sectors.  The gains from the initial imnpact  on all sectors can only be
assessed for the efficiency and quality variables for electricity and gas (input purchases)
and labor productivity gains in all sectors. This is one of the reasons why the results
presented in Table  6.1  provide a  lower bound estimate of the initial  impact of  the
privatization."  They represent US$ 1.8 billion per year for all sectors and the initial
improvement in price regulation that also resulted from the privatization resulted in an
even  bigger  impact  in  terms  of  changes  in  regulatory  rules.  If  they  had  been
implemented effectively since the beginning, the additional gains could have been the
equivalent of US$  1 billion.  This was not the case however,  at least  in water and
telecoms this was not the case and to be conservative in our assessment of the gains
from the reform, we will ignore this estimate.
Table 6.1  shows that the gains from the reform represented on average about
30%  of  what  people spend  on utilities  (or  about  1.1%  of  their  income) and  that
effective regulation would have yielded an extra 10% discount (or about 0.4% of their
income). The gains from effective regulation were however fairly unevenly distributed.
The middle class would have been much more penalized than the poorer and the largest
winner would have been the richest. The reason is that the middle class spends more
but does not enjoy all the gains due to more employment.
Table 6.1: Minimum Gain Achieved between the Transfer to the Private Operators and 1993
Income class  Savings from  Savings from effective  (A) as % of income  (B) as % of income
operational  gains (A)  regulation  class expenditure  class expenditure
(in millions  of  (B)  on utilities  on utilities
1993 US$)  (in millions  of
1993 US$)
I (poorest)  205  0  30%  0%
2  222  18  27%  2%
3  342  -89  34%  -9%
4  335  -97  27%  -8%
5(richest)  549  1123  31%  63%
Total  1653  955  30%  10%
Note: see Table 5.2
l l Another  reason is that  the govemment never would have allowed these utilities to close had they been public but
they would have had to finance them through explicit and implict subsidies which are not picked up here.26
7. How Constraining  Are Macroeconomic Shocks for Gains from Privatizations?
The welfare gains estimated so far are quite significant but they are second best
estimates since they take as given other distortions in the economy. For instance, they
assume that salaries do not adjust to clear the labor market.  In fact,  it is reasonable
however  to  ask  to  what  extent  these  gains  can  be  affected  by  other  shocks  or
adjustments to the economy including institutional adjustments that reduce some of the
distortions in the economy. For instance, and sticking to  the very  sensitive issue of
labor market adjustment, the recent developments in Argentina provide strong evidence
that the labor market followed a pattern much more dramatic than suggested by the
simulations presented so far.  Unemployment indeed increased from 9.3%  in 1993 to
over  18% in  1995. How can this be  reconciled with some of the simulations which
suggest declines in unemployment?
The  reconciliation comes from  the  inclusion in  the  model of  the  so-called
"Tequila effect"  which hit Argentina at the end of 1994 and early 1995. Around that
timne,  the Mexican crisis lead to a confidence problem among international investors
and international interest rates increased steadily during that period. The LIBOR, for
instance, increased by about 2.5%.  The way in which this international shock affected
the economy was complex, but it can be captured through the net debt position of the
industries and of the various income groups.
Table 7.1:
Financial Exposure of Consumers
Income  classes  1  2  3  4  5
i  _____________  |  (the poorest)  |  l  (the wealthiest)
Distribution of  -14.25  -28.12  -35.28  -22.35  100
Credit between
Consumers  I
Stock of Debt as  46.33  60.72  54.46  24.02  -54.02
% of Total
Income  .
Source: Chisari, 0 and C. Romero (1996), "Distribucion  del ingreso,  asignacion  de rescursos  y shocks macroeconomicos  -
Un modelo  de equilibrio  general computado  para la Argentina  en 1993," Serie Financiamento  del Desarollo, #36, CEPAL,
United  Nations, Santiago  de Chile.
Table 7.1 presents an estimate of this position. It shows essentially that the 4
poorest income groups were liable to the richest income group at the end  of  1993.
Under these conditions, a  shock on the interest rate would lead to  increases in the
supply of labor, but also to increases in costs (wiping out the cost reduction brought
about by the reforms) which in turn would lead to reductions in the demand for labor.
These two  effects together lead to  significant increases in unemployment, consistent
with those observed between 1993 and 1995.12
Note that the results  are still  somewhat  below  the unemployment  rate observed.  This can be explained
by the assumptions  made  on the expectation  of private  agents.  A sensibility  analysis  reducing  by half the
elasticity  with  respect  to the  return  to investment  with  the  same  international  shock  leads  to increases  in
unemployment  over 16%  and reductions  in GDP of 1.5%.27
This  can  be  seen  in  Table  7.2  which  compares  the  results  of  the  base
simulations  in  which  all  sectoral  changes are  accounted for  jointly  to  those  of  a
simulation in which the international rate increases by 2.5%.  It confirms the results
discussed under the base case on the importance of effective regulation for the poor. It
also shows that the middle class stands to lose the most from macroeconomic shocks of
this type whether regulation is effective or not. The main lesson to be drawn is that the
qualitative conclusions drawn so far are fairly robust but that the intensity of the gains,
while significant enough to  stimulate rent seeking behavior is  not strong enough  to
offset  the  consequences  of  important  macroeconomic  shocks.  In  other  words,
privatization and effective regulation matter but they are not the only prerequisites for
successful structural adjustments in an economy.
Table 7.2:
Comparing the Impact of Privatizations with and without the Tequila  Effect
Base Case  Tequila Effect Case
_________  ptlex  p fixed  pflex  pfixed
Unemployment Rate  8.91  9.55  11.68  12.23
(initial  value:  9.3)
Equivalent Variation  1.99  1.19  -0.80  -1.55
for income call I
(poorest)
Equivalent Variation  1.57  1.03  -0.96  -1.49
for  income  call 2
Equivalent Variation  1.38  1.05  -1.30  -1.61
for  income  call  3
Equivalent Variation  1.20  0.78  -1.23  -1.64
for  income  call 4
Equivalent Variation  1.30  1.02  -0.90  -1.19
for income call 5
(richest)
8. Summary of Main Conclusions
The significant increase in unemployment  observed since 1993 is unlikely to be
due  to  the  privatizations  of  utilities.  In  fact,  these  privatizations  generated  some
significant gains for  the economy and all income classes and  almost all  sectors are
better  off  with  the  private  operation  of  the  sector.  The  gains  from  privatization,
however, were not sufficient to offset the negative efficiency and distributional impact
on  the economy of the Tequila effect.  But the government has  a role to  play as  a
regulator  to  ensure  that  the potential gains  of  privatization are  fully  realized  and
contribute to improvements  in the income distribution of the country.
Indeed, the distribution of the gains across income classes and across sectors is
driven by the effectiveness of the regulators. Effective regulation matters not only to
allocation of resources  but  also to the  income distribution and that privatization of
utilities can be a win-win strategy. Indeed, rather than illustrating a trade-off between
efficiency and equity,  the simulations presented here reveal gains  on both  grounds.
More specifically, the isolation of the effects of private operations of public utilities in
a general equilibrium model based on the 1993 structure of the economy shows that:28
If the regulators do their job well and costs changes brought about by private
operations of utilities are passed through to the final users of the services, all
sectors (except for agriculture, forestry and fisheries) and all income classes
are better off after the reforms. Moreover, the poorest classes tend to gain
relatively more  than the  richest  classes  and  the  distribution  of  income
improves as well.
*  If the regulators are not effective in ensuring full pass through of the gains
and allow the owners of sector specific capital in the utilities sector to keep
the payoffs from changes as a quasi-rent, a few sectors will lose (agriculture,
forestry and fisheries, lumber and wood manufacturing, transport material
and equipment and financial services, insurance and enterprise services). All
others will still gain from the reform but in all cases (except construction)
less than when the regulator is effective.
*  Moreover, if the regulator is not effective, the distribution of income only
improves modestly as a result of the reforms and the distribution of the gains
is much more even across income classes.
The gains from  efficient regulation are non-trivial. While the gains  from the
private operation of utilities so far can be estimated at about US$ 2.3 billion or 0.9% of
GDP, effective regulation can save the economy an extra US$ 0.9 billion or 0.35% of
GDP. These total gains represent 80% of the investments made in the sector in  1993
($4,047) and about 60% of the investments made in  1995 ($5,105 million). They also
represent a significant rent that the main owner of the sector (including sometimes the
government) is unlikely to give up easily but that the consumers should not give up either
since it is equivalent to an average of 41% of what they spend on these services. This rent
is even larger considering that the initial gains from privatization represented, to  be
conservative, about US$ 1.6 billion for the economy as a whole.
In sum, these general equilibrium estimates suggest extremely high  economic
rates of return for the privatization and  regulation "projects"  whether distributional
weights are considered or  not but they also reveal a very high shadow price  for the
regulatory activity which tends to be  ignored in most privatization exercises. In fact,
ineffective regulation is equivalent to a  16% implicit tax on the average consumer paid
directly to the owner of the utilities' assets (rather than only to the government) but this
tax is in fact higher (20%) for the poorest income class and lowest for the median income
class. How serious governments are about the fair distribution of gains  of reform is
revealed by how serious they are about regulation.29
APPENDIX: A Formal Description of the Model.
This appendix provides a more technical description of the model used in this
paper. The specific equations are spelled out and explained for each agent.
Consumers
The representative consumer of income group h has a utility function:
[1]  Uh= Uh [cd(h), cm(h), Id'(h),  S(h), B(h), Cr(QC(h), n)],
It  is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas between all goods except for retail trade which is
assumed to be purchased in fixed proportions with the rest of the goods and services.
The preferences of domestic agents are assumed to follow an Armington specification
which implies no perfect substitutability in preferences between domestic and imported
goods. 3
Expenditures are distributed as follows:
*  domestic consumption goods cd , and investments Id at price p
*  imported goods cm  at prices Pm,
*  "bonds" services B at prices Pb,  and
*  goods and services of "privatized" firms represented by an index C, which combines
the quantity Qc with quality  7t at price rc per unit of Qc; this way a change in quality
is not necessarily associated with a change in the price of the service provided by the
privatized firm. Cr can follow a multiplicative  form such as: C, =  Qc v(Q  hr  ) where
7iN is the normal quality level and v is a non-decreasing function of  hr  /7 N. An
increase in service failures increases costs for the buyer of services because the
consumer needs to buy a larger number of physical units to reach the desired flow of
services. This "naive" modeling approach allows for instance to model the costs of
power losses or interruptions as a proportion  of unit costs.
In some simulations, prices are differentiated per income groups rc.
Equation [2] gives the budget constraint for income group h:
[2]  (1  +ti)[pId(h) + pcd(h)] +  (1  +tm)pmc m(h) +  (1 +tir) rc C,(h)+  PbB(h)  =
=  [wS(h)  +  wgSg(h) +  0(h)(rpKpo  + rKp,O +NP+  NP )  +
+  Or(h) (rrK,o  +  Nr )] (1-td)  +  pbB 0(h)+ PR  R°-
13  Although  not necessary to ensure that the economy does not end up specializing, by assumption,  the capital
installed  in the tradeable  sectors  cannot  be reallocated30
The family pays indirect taxes at rates t 1 and tir, depending on the type of good
and service, and direct taxes td  and taxes on imports tin.  Its income sources are labor
income in the private sector S at salary  w, in the public sector Sg with salary wg and
capital KX) in private firms remunerated at rate  rp; revenue from profits on domestic
sales Np and sales abroad NPX  and revenue from participation in the privatized firm Nr
in proportion to shares owned, indicated as Or;  Or also represents the participation of the
income group in each sector specific capital rpKp,  rpKpxo  and rrK r  . In the scenarii in
which capital is specific, the profit rates enter fully rp or rr.  Bo represents holdings of
private sector bonds. The initial "holdings are negative if the consumption group is a
net debtor in the benchmark simulation; in this case, an increase in Pb results probably
in an increase in the supply of labor and a reduction in the expednitures of the quintile.
Families also get public sector transfers represented as the purchase by the government
of a service with an inelastic supply,  R° at price PR,
Private firms
The private firms are those for which there was no change in ownership or any
major organizational change during the period covered by  the study.  They produce
goods and  services intended for  intermediate and  final consumption as  well as  for
export and investment. This differentiation is needed to be able to account properly for
the differences in the tax treatment of the various destinations (for instance, exporters
do not pay the VAT and benefit from discounts on their gross income tax). There is no
technological differentiation across these sectors.
Exporters of goods are price-takers abroad and exports  of services are  price
inelastic  (i.e.  they  are  constant).  Non-tradable prices  are  deterrnined as  solution
variables and adjust with factor income until markets are in equilibrium.
The profit function for a private firm can thus be written as:
[3]  N'  =  [p  - apb  - apE(zrE+(l-z)rc)-  f(l+ti)  - fm(l+tm)pm]Qp  - wLp(1+tvl)  -
rpKp(1  + tv2),
and for exporters, it can be adjusted as:
[4] Npx  =  [Px - apb -(p(zrE+(1-z)rc) - f(l  +t;)  - fm (1 +tm)Pm]XP  - (w.Lpx +  rpKpx).
where  parameter  a  is the  credit  requirements per  unit  of  output,  while aLp
represents the quantity of services provided by the privatized company to obtain a unit
of output. Moreover,  l-z  indicates the share of  privatized services requirements per
unit of output purchased through distribution companies at price rc, while z is the share
purchased  on  the  wholesale market  at  prices  rE.  Purchases  of  electricity  in  the31
wholesale market cosrrespond to generation, purchases on the retail market correspond
to distribution.
The inter-industrial transactions in these simplified expression are represented by a
coefficient  f  for  national goods  and  fm for  imported  intermediate  inputs.  These
requirements are proportional to total production  QP  ,and to exports XP respectively.
Privatized goods and services are also proportional to output which is different from
the assumption made for consumers where rationing could take place. However, firms
can be subject to adjustment in quality of services just as consumers and hence can face
differences  in  cost  for  the  same  service.1 4 An  improvement in  service  quality  is
represented by a reduction in parameter a,  i.e.
a'()  <  0.
If  {A}nxn  is the input-output matrix, this quality improvement is equivalent to a cut
in  the  absolute  value  of  the  input  requirements.  Remuneration  rp includes  total
payments to capital and hence amortization. This means that the savings and investment
decisions are taken by households in the model. The tax tV,  corresponds to the VAT
and to the labor taxes collected at the firm level while  tv2 corresponds to similar taxes
on capital.  For the sake of simplicity, the taxes on labor and capital levied on exports
are not included here, even if in the model this is done more accurately.
The product is obtained by combining intermediate inputs and value added in fixed
proportions. The value added itself is obtained by combining labor and capital inputs in
a CES production:
[5]  VAp =  F(Lp,Kp) =  [b,Lpk  +  b2KpkVlk,
where k is the elasticity of substitution of labor and capital while the bi are distribution
parameters used in the calibration of the model.
For exports, the value added function is similar:
[6]  VAPX  =  F(Lpx,Kpx).
More generally, the product of sector j,  QTpj,  is obtained from a fixed coefficient
function (Leontief) between intermediate consumption and value added:
[7]  QTpj =  min {Qlj/aij .... Aq/anp Vapj/avj }
where Qij is the quantity consumed of good i for producing j.
This assumes that there  is no possibility  of using "home-made'  substitutes  for infrastructure  services.32
Privatized utilities
The privatized firms sell to the domestic market mostly. With the exception of some
differentiation due to regulation, service obligations or to taxes according to their final
users,  each utility  sector is assumed to sell a  single product.  Their profit  function
includes any subsidy TG that could be transferred by the public sector and is written
as:
[8]  Nr  =  rcQc  +  rEQE +  rGQG - [arpb  +  a  r(zrE+( 1 -z)rc)
+  f(1+ti)  +  fm (I+tm)Pm](QC+QE+QG)  - wLr(1+tv 1)  - rrKr(l+tv 2 )  +  TG
where  Qc  is  the  quantity  of  product  sold  to  households at  a  unit  price  rc,  QE
corresponds to the goods and services sold to the firms at price rE y the index G is used
for  the  public  sector  wherever  a  distinction  is  relevant.  This  also  allows  a
differentiation  of  tariffs  into  retail,  wholesale  or  commercial  and  residential  as
necessary.  The  quality  variables  are  modeled  as  an  improvement  in  the  overall
efficiency of the sector.
It  is  important to  note that all outputs are  limited by capacity and transmission
constraints  incorporated through  the  value  added  function.  The  product  of  the
privatized sector is also based on a fixed proportions production function:
[91  Qri =  min {QMi/aii,...  Qni/ani,  Vari/aVri  yt
where aji is the input requeriment of j by firm i.
The value added function in the privatized sector are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.
[10]  VAri  =  A  L  'a Kril-a,
where A is a constant. The installed capital of the firm was taken as given:
[11]  Kri  =  Kori
This  description of the technology of the private and  privatized firms  was used to
model the changes in productivity, efficiency and quality.
Price regulation is modeled as RPI- X, where X is set to 0 at the beginning of the
contract. This implies that the rc is:
rc/rc0 (PQ° 0/P0Q0 - X)  I03
where P  is the price vector of private and privatized domestic goods composing the
Laspeyres-index of retail prices in the based year with weights given by Q° .and where
is a correction coefficient for the tariffs (with  =1 in the benchmark scenario).
The Public Sector
The government maximizes a social welfare y including current collective goods H
produced with goods and services purchased G, Gr, employment L.,  bonds Bg (which
can be sold domestically or internationally), retirees services R, and a proxy for future
collective  goods Ig, public  investment:
[12]  y = y[H(G,Gr,Lg), Bg, R, Ig].
The function y(.)  is a Cobb-Douglas and H(.)  is a Leontief in G,  L.  and Gr which
includes all  the privatized services in  fixed proportions.  Pensions,  bonds services,
investments,  and  current  operative  expenses  are  a  constant  proportion  of  total
government income in this model.
The government faces a budget constraint given by:
[13]  t1 if(pQ +  p,X)  +  p1d  +pcd]  +  t4 1 w(Lp+Lr)+  tv2(rpKp+rrKr) +
tmpmfm(Q+X)+  tmpmc m +  td(wL +  wgSg  +rK°  +N'  +  Np - pe)  +  pbBg, +
a?, (rrKro+N' )
p(G + Ig) +  rG Gr + wgLg + PbBg + pRR + TG.
In  this equation, ag is the participation of the public sector in the ownership of
capital of the "privatized" utilities.
The Rest of the World.
The foreign consumer has a Cobb-Douglas  utility function:
[14]  u  = u (M, Xc,  Bx);
subject to the following constraints,
[15] PmM  - Z*Vd  =  0,
for imports M, produced with a single factor Vd  at price z*,
[16]  pXs-  z*Vx  = 0,34
for exports X, where VX is the quantity of the foreign factor needed to produce Xs, a
perfect substitute to Argentina's exports.
This foreign consumer faces the following budget constraint:
[17] p,,Xc + PmMC  + pbBX  =  pbBX°  + z*(Vi + Vx) +  *(rrKro  +Nr  ),
i.e. his revenue comes from payments to V-from its share of capital in the privatized
sector- and from bonds and his expenditures are Xc in the exports markets and Mc in
the imports markets.
Equation [18] sets the export prices at the international level:
[18]  Px  X  _  pX =  0.
Considering that Am y a Ax are the foreign technological parameters, [19] y [20]
determine a linear transformation curve abroad and fixes the relative prices faced by
Argentina:
[19] M =  Vd/Am7
[20] X 5 = VX/Ax.
The Labor Market
Constraint [21] describes the imbalance in the labor market and  in the model  is
replaced by equation [22] determining the salary in the private sector of the economy.
The labor market for the public sector clears as shown by [23] accounting for the fact
that  Sg is an obervation:
[21]  Lp + Lpx +  Lr  S,
[22]  w = b w*,
[23]  Lg =  Sg.
Parameter b  is calibrated for the equilibrium salary in the economy, so that the
initial unemployment rate is equal to the observed unemployment rate; this value of b
is then kept constant throughout the counterfactual  exercises.35
Investment Goods Industries.
Investment goods industries were divided into two main categories: those providing
capital goods for private firms and those that construct specific capital for each one of
the privatized utilities (electricity, gas, water and telecommunication). This procedure
allows the recognition of the differential impact of investment schedules established by
the  regulatory  contracts -for  example, as  network  expansion commitments- on  the
economy  (mainly on  the  rate  of  unemployment and  the  trade  balance);  therefore,
special effort was devoted to determine the input composition of each industry.
The Market for "Bonds".
The  financial  market  is  highly  simplified  in  this  model  in  contrast  to  the
sophistication of Argentina's financial sector. As already mentioned, there  are fixed
requirements of credit per unit of output in each production sector, including recently
privatized utilities. Additionally, domestic consumers can be separated into net debtors
(tipically the four poorest income brackets, to meet their demand for durable goods)
and net creditors (the fifth income bracket); the rest of the world was a considered a net
creditor too for the benchmark. In terms of the bonds market, debtors were represented
as  issuers and  creditors as  subscribers.Therefore for domestic families and  for  the
foreign consumers, bonds were introduced in the model giving them initial endowments
but  also  introducing  preferences  for  bond  holdings  as  arguments  in  their  utility
functions. IS
The market for bonds is therefore represented as:
[24] B(h) + Bg + Bx + a(QP +  XP +  IP) + ar (QC + QE + QG)
=  BO(h) +  BOg +  BOx.
The information on sectoral and personal net financial positions was obtained from
monetary authorities and estimated using purchases of durables goods and total capital
holdings.
The domestic bonds market adjusts to the internal credit disequilibria of the families
and of  the govermnent and to Argentina's disequilibrium with the rest of the world.
Internally, the first 4 quintiles sell "bonds" (which is basically a credit instrument) to
the richest. A net increase in the demand for bonds thus reduces the purchasing power
of the 4 poorest income groups. An increase in the price of bonds is compensated by a
decline in the purchase of other goods and with an increase in the labor supply which
5 The information on sectoral and personal net financial  positions  was obtained from monetarey
authorities  and estimated  using  purchases  of durable  goods  and  total  capital  holdings.36
can contribute to an in increase in unemployment. The firms also demand bonds as a
fixed proportion of their  value added. For them, an  increase in the price  of  bonds
implies a cut in the marginal product of labor; which in turns leads to a reduction in the
demand for labor, adding to the unemployment problem.
The benchmark simulation of the model includes both a  positive unemployment
level and a commercial deficit. This implies that in addition to a disequilibrium in the
labor market, the rest of the world is financing consumption and domestic investment.
The implications for the bond market is an increase in the demand for bonds issued by
domestic agents and purchased by foreigners.  Due to an increase in the international
interest rate, as in the case of the Tequila effect, foreign investors stop buying domestic
bonds.'6
16  Between October 1993 and  October 1995, the LIBOR  jumped from 3.4% to 5.8% and the PRIME from 6% to
7.8%, while the domestic interest rate increased from 9% in October 1993  to 14% in November 1994 and over
33% in March 1995. Simultaneously, unemployment  increased from 9.3% to 12.2% and the share of problem
portofolio pover total portfolio increased  to over 10% in the 3rd quarter of 1994  and to over 30% in the 2nd
quarter of 1995. These facts were used in the calibration of the model.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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